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BANKRUPTcY-SALS FREE FROM LIENS-SUBROGATION OF SuRry.--One Brown
was surety on notes of one Thompson. ,The notes were reduced to judgment and
secured by attachment liens on land about a year before Thompson was adjudged
a bankrupt, and Brown as surety paid part of the judgments. The trustees in
bankruptpy sold the land free from liens under a compromise agreement with other
judgment creditors, to which arrangement the surety was not a party. The
grantee of the land now seeks to enjoin further prosecution of equity suits by the
surety for the enforcement of the liens. Held, that the surety was subrogated to
the rights of the creditors under the attachment liens and was not estopped to
enforce them against the land by reason of the sale free from incumbrances.
In re Thompson (1923, W. D. Pa.) 288 Fed. 385.
The present Bankruptcy Act makes no express provision for the sale of the
bankrupt's assets free from liens. Because such a proceeding is often desirable in
order to simplify and speed up administration of the bankrupt estate, it was early
held, in reliance upon decisions under prior acts, that the courts might authorize
sales free from liens, rendering to mortgagees and lienors their respective priorities
in the proceeds. it re Pittelkow (1899, E. D. Wis.) 92 Fed. 9O1; In re Keet
(19o3, M. D. Pa.) 128 Fed. 651; In re Union Trust Ca. (1903, C. C. A. Ist) 122
Fed. 937. But it must first appear that the sale free from liens will probably
result in substantial benefit to the unsecured creditors without prejudicing the
lienors. See In re Harralson. (igio, C. C. A. 8th) 179 Fed. 49o; In re Progres-
sive Wall Paper Co. (9,5, N. D. N. Y.) 222 Fed. 87. And sufficient notice must
be given to all parties vitally concerned so that they have a full opportunity to
be heard. See In re Kohl-Hepp Brick Co. (191o, C. C. A. 2d) 176 Fed. 340. At
common law upon. his satisfaction of the amount due, a surety is by the right of
subrogation entitled to all the means held by the creditor for enforcing payment
of that particular claim. State Bank v. Snith (1898) 155 N. Y. 185, 49 N. E. 68o;
Huffinond v. Bence (1891) 128 Ind. 131, 27 N. E. 347; Lidderdale's Ex'rs v.
Robinson's Ex'r (1827, U. S.) 12 Wheat. 594; Spencer, Suretyship (1913) sec. 140.
And in state court proceedings, such subrogation is conditioned on payment of
the entire amount due. Stamford Bank v. Benedict (1843) 15 Conn. 437;
Musgrave v. Dickson (1896) 172 Pa. 629, 33 Atl. 705; Spencer, op. cit. supra,
secs. 134, 136. The Bankruptcy Act, however, specifically provides that a surety
paying in whole or in part shall be subrogated to that extent to the rights of the
creditor. Sec. 57 (i). Where there is a valid attachment lien against specific
property, it. seems that the lienor should have, in the event of a sale free from
incumbrances, a prior claim against the proceeds to which the surety should be
subrogated pro tanto. In that way only could the power of sale free from
incumbrances be exercised without departure from the letter of the Act. But as
in the instant case, the sale to which the surety was not a party should not affect
his rights.
CARRIERs-DEPENDENT SEsWcEs-GRATT oF ExcLusivE PmvEGF.-The plaintiff
granted a taxi company the exclusive privilege of soliciting trade at its depot. The
defendants, competing taxi operators, continued to await passengers on the
plaintiff's property. Plaintiff sought to enjoin defendants from entering upon the
station grounds for the purpose of securing fares. Held, (two judges dissenting)
that the injunction should not be granted. Kansao City Terminal Ry. v. James
(1923, Mo.) 251 S. W. 53.
Two of the majority judges based their decision upon Art. 12, sec. 23 of the
Missouri constitution prohibiting "discrimination in charges or facilities in trans-
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portation . . . . between transportation companies and individuals." But this
provision applies only to discrimination between users of the railroad as a carrier.
Skaggs v. Kansas City Terminal Co. (1916, W. D. Mo.) 233 Fed. 827; Old
Colony R. R. v. Tripp (1888) 147 Mass. 35, 17 N. E. 89; contra: Kalamazoo
Hack & Bus Co. v. Soot na (18go) 84 Mich. 194, 47 N. W. 667. The other three
judges adopted a minority view that the exclusive contract is void as against public
policy. State v. Reed (1898) 76 Miss. 211, 24 So. 308; Palmer Transfer Co. v.
Anderson (199o) 131 Ky. 217, II5 S. W. 182. The dissenting opinion is in accord
with the great weight of authority that if the service under the exclusive contract
is adequate for the public, the exclusion of competitors is reasonable regulation.
Donovan. v. Penn R. R. (195o) 199 U. S. 279, 26 Sup. Ct 91; N. Y. Cent. &
H. R. R. R. v. Ryan (1911, Sup. Ct.) 71 Misc. 241, 129 N. Y. Supp. 55;
Trompson's Express Co. v. Mount (192o) 91 N. J. Eq. 497, I1 At. 173. But
even in jurisdictions adopting this view, competitors will not be enjoined if the
exclusion is clearly harmful to the public interest. Philadelphia & Cainden Ferry
Co. v. Johnson (1923, N. J. Ch.) 121 AtI. goo. It seems that the railroad is
under no duty to permit taxicab owners to come on its premises except as its duty
of public service requires it. Wyman, Public Service Corporations (1911) sec.
472. And it has been held that the travelling public is best served when only one
responsible company solicits business at a railway station. N. Y., N. H. & H.,
R. R. v. Scovill (1898) 71 Conn. 136, 41 AtI. 246; contra: Wyman, op. cit. supra,
sec. 485. The desirability of exclusive service should be determined with reference
to local conditions, and is a matter peculiarly adapted for regulation by a public
service commission. United Cominercial Travellers v. Marshal Bros. Livery
[1918 E] Pub. Ut. Rep. (Mo.) 391; Rose v. Pub. Ser. Com. (1914) 75 W. Va. i;
83 S. E. 85.
CoapoRATIoNs-PRomoTExs' CONTRACrs-AcEPTANCE OF BENEFITs BY CORPORA-
TION AN ADopTno.-The plaintiff delivered building materials pursuant to a
contract with the promoters of the defendant club before its incorporation. After
incorporation, the club through its president gave a note to cover the amount due
for the materials. About a month prior to the final delivery of all the material the
corporation acquired title to the lots upon which the deliveries had been made.
The plaintiff subsequently filed a materialman's lien against this property, and sued
to foreclose the lien. Held, that the corporation adopted the contract and that the
plaintiff could foreclose his lien for the amount of the note. Breckenridge City
Club v. Hardin (1923, Tex. Civ. App.) 253 S. W. 873.
It has been held that a contract made on behalf of a non-existent corporation is
a nullity. Hudson v. Portland Ry. (1923, Or.) 211 Pac. 897. And that an
attempted ratification by the company after incorporation cannot give it validity,
since it would relate back to a time when no principal was in existence. Bagot
Tyre Co. v. Clipper Tyre Co. [19o2] i Ch. 146; contra: Stanton v. New York Ry.
(189o) 59 Conn. 272, 22 At. 300. It is also urged that it would enable the promo-
ters to prejudice the rights of future stockholders. Reiff v. Nebraska Co. (1921,
C. C. A. 8th) 277 Fed. 417. In England and Massachusetts a new contract is
required to make the corporation liable. Howard v. Patent Co. (1888) L. R. 38
Ch. 156; Whiting v. Barton (910) 204 Mass. 16q, 90 N. E. 528. And the accept-
ance of benefits will then create at most a quasi-contractual obligation. Lumsden
v. Shipcote Co. [19o6] 2 K. B. 433. By the majority American view, however, the
corporation may adopt the promoters' contract. Morgan v. Bon Bon Co. (1917)
222 N. Y. 22, 118 N. E. 205; (x918) 18 COL. L. Rxv. 275. Or treat it as a
continuing offer which the corporation may accept. Hackbarth v. Wilson Lumber
Co. (1923, Idaho) 212 Pac. 969. An acceptance of the benefits of the contract
with knowledge of the incidental burdens constitutes an adoption. Morgan v.
Bon Bon Co., supra. But the corporate liability dates only from the time of the
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adoption. McArthur v. Timws Printing Co. (1892) 48 Minn. 319, 51 N. W. 216;
i Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations (1917) sec. 152. A few states impose liability
from the time of the original contract either on the ground of estoppel or as a
novation. Packer v. Frank (1922, Sup. Ct) 119 Misc. 398, i96 N. Y. Supp. 289;
Weatherford v. Granger (1894) 86 Tex. 350, 24 S. W. 795; Harrill v. Davis
(19og, C. C. A. 8th) 168 Fed. 187; contra: Fuller v. Stout (1917) 66 Okla. 15,
166 Pac. 898. And the execution of a note in recognition of the promoters'
contract has been held to constitute such a novation. Paxton v. First National
Bank (1887) 21 Neb. 621, 33 N. W. 271. Otherwise where the corporation merely
purchases lots upon which materials had been delivered. The promoters cannot
charge with a mechanic's lien property afterwards acquired by the corporation.
Tryber v. Girard Co. (19o3) 67 Kan. 489, 73 Pac. 83. But a new contract made
by the corporation after the work is finished, and with knowledge of all the facts,
may support such a lien. Waddy Creamery v. Davis Mfg. Co. (1898) 1O3 Ky.
579, 45 S. W. 895.
DAMAGES-MALICIOUS PROSECUTION-AWARD oF ExCESsIvE EXEMPLARY DAM-
AGES BY JURY.-The plaintiff left the defendant and married after having illicit
relations with him over a period of years. On her refusal to return, the defen-
dant prosecuted her for swindling and had her arrested as a fugitive from
justice. The plaintiff was discharged and brought an action for malicious
prosecution. The jury rendered a verdict for two thousand dollars compensatory,
and eight thousand dollars exemplary damages. The defendant appealed, alleg-
ing that the verdict was excessive. Held, that the verdict was not excessive.
Foster v. Bourgeois (1923, Tex. Civ. App.) 253 S. W. 88o.
The general rule allowing exemplary or punitive damages, where the defendant's
conduct is wanton or malicious, proceeds on the theory of punishment or example.
Inasmuch as it allows a plaintiff to recover more than he has lost, it has been
subjected to much adverse criticism. .3 Parsons, Contracts (9th ed. 19Oi) 187;
Hartmann, Exemplary Damages a Deformity in Our Law (igi ) 2 MARQUE=E L.
REV. 57. In contract cases such damages are awarded only in actions for breach
of promise of marriage, where there are circumstances of humiliation or abrupt-
ness. Thorn v. Knapp (i87o) 42 N. Y. 474; see Trout v. Watkins Livery Co.
(1IO) 148 Mo. App. 621, 130 S. W. 136. A few jurisdictions refuse to allow
damages in excess of compensation in any case, in the absence of statute. Fay v.
Parker (1872) 53 N. H. 342; Ellis v. Brockton Pub. Co. (igo8) ig8 Mass. 538,
84 N. E. loi8. In at least one jurisdiction so-called punitive damages are limited
to the expense of suit, and hence are really compensatory. Malley v. Lane
(192) 97 Conn. 133, 115 Atl. 674. It has been suggested that the award of
exemplary damages, being in the nature of a fine, places a defendant in double
jeopardy, when the wrong for which he is being sued is also a crime. Marr,
The Punitive Damages Heresy (1917) 2 So. L. QUART. i, io. And it has .been
held that they cannot be assessed in such cases. Anderson v. Evansville Brewing
Assoc. (1912) 49 Ind. App. 4o3, 97 N. E. 445; contra: Wirsing v. Smith (igos)
= Pa. 8, 7o Atl. 9o6. It has also been held that to compel a witness to testify
to matters which would make him liable to exemplary damages violates the
privilege against self-incrimination. Wilson v. Union, Tool Co. (1921, S. D.
Calif.) 275 Fed. 624; contra: Southern R. R. v. Bush (1898) 122 Ala. 470, 26
So. 168. The amount of exemplary damages is ordinarily for the jury. Rogers
v. Bigelow (1915) 90 Vt 41, 96 Atl. 417. But the verdict may be set aside if
so excessive as to indicate undue passion or prejudice. Louisville & Nashville
Ry. v. Roth (19o8) 13o Ky. 759, 114 S. W. 264; Bauer, Excessive Exemplary
Damages (1918) 52 Am. L. Ray. ii. In the instant case the court might well
have done this. Even the possible legitimate indignation of the jury does not
seem to justify such large damages"
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EVIDENCE-COMPARISON OF HANDWITING-ADMISSIBILITY OF RELEVANT HAND-
WRITING WHEN PajuIcr AL.-The defendant was prosecuted for uttering a
forged check, and at the trial the sole issue was whether the signature on the
forged check was in the defendant's handwriting. The state, over objection
by the defendant's counsel, was permitted to put in evidence other forged checks
alleged to have been written by the defendant for the purpose of comparison.
Held, (one judge dissenting) that even genuine handwriting should not be used
for the purpose of comparison if it tends to establish irrelevant or prejudicial
matter. State v. Lyle (1923, S. C.) II8 S. E. 803.
Most jurisdictions, by statute or judicial decision, allow comparisons of hand-
writing with any writing admitted or proved to be genuine. Turnure v. Breitung
(1921) 195 App. Div. 2oo, i86 N. Y. Supp. 62o; Lyon v. Lyman (1831) 9 Conn.
55;- 62 L. R. A. 817, note; (921) 34 HARv. L. REv. 788. Genuine writings even
when otherwise irrelevant are admissible for such comparison. University of
Illinois v. Spalding (IoI) 71 N. H. 163, 5i Atl. 731; Williams v. Williams
(1912) io9 Me. 537, 85 Atl. 43; (92) 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 524; contra:
Sulzby v. Palmer (1916) 194 Ala. 524, 70 So. i. But such evidence is restricted
to actual juxtaposition of the two writings for the purpose of identifying the
author of the disputed writing. Travis v. Brown (1862) 43 Pa. 9; 3 Chamber-
layne, Modern Law of Evidence (1912) sec. 22I4a; 4 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed.
1923) sec. 1992. Generally the admission of a writing as a standard of compari-
son is at the discretion of the trial judge. Williams v. Williams, supra. But the
decision is reviewable on appeal. Brantley v. State (1922, Fla.) 94 So. 678.
Specimens of handwriting already part of the record or in the case for other
purposes are always available for comparison. Stokes v. United States (i895)
157 U. S. 187, I5 Sup. Ct. 617; Webb v. Bryant (1923, Ala.) 96 So. 907; 9 Ann.
Cas. 451, note. This is true though the specimen contains prejudicial matter.
People v. Bibby (I8qi) 9I Calif. 470, 27 Pac. 781; Fry v. State (1919) 86 Tex.
Cr. 73, 215 S. W. 560. But a specimen not in the record, though relevant, may
be excluded when others are available, if it contains matter prejudicial to the
other party. Gambrill v. Schooley (1902) 95 Md. 260, 52 Atl. 5oo; 63 L. R. A.
427, note. The same rule has been applied where other specimens are not
available. Hatch v. State (1879) 6 Tex. Cr. App. 384; Cox v. State (igo9) 162
Ala. 66, 5o So. 398; see Mississippi Lumber Co. v. Kelly (i9o5) ir S. D. 577, 104
N. W. 265; but cf. Gambrill v. Schooley, supra. This view seems sound, as the
danger of an unfair selection and of raising collateral issues is particularly
strong where a writing contains prejudicial matter. And the exclusion of such
evidence is in line with holdings in analogous cases. Thus the number of speci-
mens may be limited. Crane v. Dexter (1893) 5 Wash. 479, 32 Pac. 223. And
where the writing was made under circumstances creating a prejudicial inference
it is inadmissible. People v. Creegan (I898) 121 Calif. 554, 53 Pac. 1082 (possible
inference of other forgeries). In the instant case there were other available
standards for comparison and the court soundly excluded the offered writing.
INJUNCTIoN-TRESPAss TO LAND--BALANCE OF CONVENrNcE.-The defendant
owned minerals underlying certain land owned by the plaintiff. The only practical
method of mining the mineral was to strip the surface which was practically
worthless except for pasturage. The lower court enjoined the defendant from
stripping the surface. The defendant appealed. Held, that as the defendant's
loss would be incomparably greater than the plaintiff's damage, the injunction
should not have been granted. Barker v. Mintz (1923, Colo.) 215 Pac. 534.
Some courts have expressly refused to follow the doctrine of the instant case
because it allows a wrong-doer to compel innocent persons to sell their property
rights at a valuation, which is equivalent to giving a private individual the power
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of eminent domain. Lynch v. Union Institution (1893) i58 Mass. 394, 33 N. E.
6o3; Goodson v. Richardson (1873) L. R. 9 Ch. App. 221. Others have refused
on the ground that equity as a matter of course should grant an injunction against
the threatened invasion of a clear property right. Longton v. Stedman (1914)
182 Mich. 405, 148 N. W. 738; 'Mobile & Ohio Ry. v. Zimmern (1921) 2o6 Ala.
37, 89 So. 475; Moss v. Jourdan (i922, Miss.) 92 So. 689; Felsenthal v. Warring
(1919) 40 Calif. App. iIq, i8o Pac. 67; 5 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (4th
ed. I9'9) sec. i922. It' has been suggested that the adoption of this doctrine
would lead to a difficulty in predicting the action of courts of equity. Norxs (i9">)
36 HAIv. L. REv. 2H. But notwithstanding the above objections, it seems well
recognized that equity will in some cases of continuous trespasses refuse to
grant an injunction. Crescent Mining Co. v. Silver King Mining Co. (i898)
17 Utah, 444, 54 Pac. 244; McCann v. Chasin Power Co. (914) 211 N. Y. 3oi,
IO5 N. E. 416. Some courts have also "balanced the convenience" in nuisance
cases. Madison v. Ducktown Copper Co. (i9o4) 113 Tenn. 331, 83 S. W. 658;
Bliss v. Anaconda Mining Co. (i9o9, C. C. D. Mont.) 167 Fed. 342; contra:
Meux Brewery Co. v. City of London Elec. Light Co. [I895] 1 Ch. 287; State,
ex rel. Hopkins, v. Excelsior Powder Mfg. Co. (1914) 259 Mo. 254, i69 S. W. 267.
A distinction has been made between nuisances and continuing trespasses in that
the former are mere interferences with property while the latter amount to a
deprivation. Noms (1922) 36 HAav. L. REv. 21. But a nuisance is as much
a continued invasion of a clear legal right as a trespass, and is pro tanto a
deprivation of property. Where the general public interest is involved the courts
are less willing to grant injunctions. Frost v. Los Angeles (I919) 18i Calif.
22, 183 Pac. 342 (supply of water by city) ; Schwarrenbach, v. Oneonta Power
Co. (I9i) 144 App. Div. 884, 129 N. Y. Supp. 384, affirmed 207 N. Y.
671, ioo N. E. 1134 (overflow of water necessary to supply light and power);
(IY-'2) 31 YALE LAW JOUNAL, 330; (1920) i8 MIcH. L. Rev. 703; contra:
Mobile & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Zimmern, supra. It is not always realized that in
applying the doctrine of the "balance of convenience" courts not only compare
the relative loss and gain to the parties in this litigation, but consider also the
effect upon the community at large. Society as a whole loses if the defendant is
compelled to produce his ore at a great cost while the gain to the plaintiff is
only slight. The same rule of policy has often led courts to deny specifici
performance of covenants in cases where changed conditions caused by the
lapse of time make strict performance socially undesirable. Bochterle v. Saunders
(913) 36 R. L 39, 88 Atl. 803 (agreement to remove dwelling house not
enforced); Curran v. Holyoke Water Power Co. (874) 1i6 Mass. 90 (com-
pliance with agreed boundary line not compelled) ; Chicago & Alton R. R.- v.
Schoeneman (1878) 90 Ill. 258 (covenant to build bridge not enforced).
INSURANcE-DEATH IN BATTLE WITHIN "AccIDENTAl." CLusE.-The defendant
issued a policy providing for double indemnity if death should result di:ectly
from "external, violent, and accidental" means. The insured was drafted into
the United States Army and met death in battle. Held, that a judgment in favor
of the beneficiary be affirmed. Great Southern Life Insurance Co. v. Churchwell
(1923, Okla.) 216 Pac. 676.
The few cases on the point tend to accord with the instant case. State Ins.
Co. v. Allison (1920, C. C. A. 5th) 269 Fed. 93; contra: Martin v. People's Life
Ins. Co. (ir~o) 145 Ark. 43, 223 S. W. 389. "Accidental" in insurance policies
has frequently been defined as "happening by chance; unexpectedly taking place;
not according to the usual course of things; or not as expected." Barry v.
United States (1888) 131 U. S. 1oo, 9 Sup. Ct. 755; Aetna Ins. Co. v. Little
(1920) 146 Ark. 70, 225 S. W. 298. But it has been held that death resulting
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even from an intentional assault upon the insured is "accidental." Kascoutas v.
Federal Ins. Co. (1921) 193 Iowa, 343, 185 N. W. 125. Unless the insured was
the aggressor. Meister v. Fire Assurance Corp. (igig) 92 Or. 96, 179 Pac. 913.
And so where a mob hanged the insured. Fidelity Co. v. Johnson (1894) 721
Miss. 333, 17 So. 2. The above definition must &ierefore be limited at least to
means unexpected from the point of view of the insured. But some cases fall
outside even of this limitation as it has been held that voluntary exposure to
known danger does not necessarily preclude the insured from recovery, as where
the insured engaged in an altercation with a drunkard while voluntarily trying
to oust him from a hotel. Lovelace v. Travellers' Assoc. (1894) 126 Mo. 1O4,
28 S. W. 877. And where the insured embarked on a ship later sunk by a
submarine. Woods v. Standard Ins. Co. (igi8) 166 Wis. 504, 166 N. W. 20.
And where the insured enlisted. State Ins. Co. v. Allison, supra. And where
the insured, a volunteer in the state militia, exposed himself to sniping strikers
while treating a wounded man. Interstate Assoc. v. Lester (I919, C. C. A. 8th)
257 Fed. 225. It seems, therefore, more in harmony with the cases to suggest
that no injury may be deemed "accidental" if any intentional or reckless act of
the insured contributed directly to the result, or if it was of such a nature as
to have been definitely foreseen by him as it occurred. Exactly how far the
insured may go in voluntary exposure is not determinable on the cases. But
the instant case is well within the authorities.
INSURANCE-PAYMENT OF PREMFUMS wrrH STOLEN FUNDS-RIGHT TO INSUR-
ANCE MoNEY.-The insured took out a policy on his life payable to his wife
and paid most of the premiums with money stolen from the plaintiff. The
plaintiff sued the wife to recover the insurance fund paid her at her husband's
death. The defendant demurred to a complaint setting up these facts. Under
Ga. Civ. Code, I9IO, sec. 2498, a direction by the insured that the money be paid
"to his personal representative, or to his widow, or to his children or to his
assignee" cannot be defeated. Held, (two judges dissenting) that the demurrer
be sustained. Bennett v. Rosborough (1923, Ga.) 116 S. E. 788.
Where all the premiums on a policy made payable or assigned to the wife of
the insured have been paid with stolen funds, the wife is treated as a volunteer
and the insurance money is impressed with a trust in her hands. Holmes v.
Gilman (1893) 138 N. Y. 369, 34 N. E. 205; Shaler v. Trowbridge (1877) 28
N. J. Eq. 595; Vance, Insurance (19o4) 407. And if only a part of the
premiums have been so paid the cestui has been held to get a pro tanto share
in the proceeds. Dayton v. Claflin Co. (1897) ig App. Div. 120; 45 N. Y. Supp.
,oo5; contra: Hubbard v. Stapp (1889) 32 Ill. App. 541 (lien for premiums
paid with such funds). A somewhat analogous situation is presented where an
insolvent husband uses part of his assets to insure his life for the benefit of his
wife. Some courts regard the transaction as a fraudulent conveyance, and as
against general creditors, allow the wife nothing. Lehman v. Gunn (1899) 124
Ala. 213, 27 So. 475. Other courts give the wife the entire proceeds of the policy
where only a moderate portion of the earnings of the insured were paid in
premiums. Central Bank v. Hume (1888) 128 U. S. 195, 9 Sup. Ct. 41. See
Williston, Can An Insolvent Insure His Life For The Benefit of His Wife?
(i8gi) 25 Am. L. Rr.v. 185. Many statutes have adopted an intermediate view
allowing the wife the proceeds of the policy less the premium paid during
insolvency. Ohio Rev. Gen. Code, 1921, sec. 9394; Minn. Gen. Sts. 1913, sec.
3465; Hurd's Ill. Rev. Sts. 1gig, ch. 73, sec. 199. Where the insured has reserved
the power to change the beneficiary, under the Bankruptcy Act, sec. 7oa (3),
the trustee can exercise the power and deprive the wife of the cash surrender
value of the policy. Cohen v. Samuels (1917) 245 U. S. 50, 38 Sup. Ct. 36; see
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(i918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 403; (1922) 31 ibid. 325. But the statute in the
instant case seems to make the exercise of such power personal to the insured.
Perhaps, then, a strict construction of its language warrants the decision. But,
as pointed out by the dissent, while the intent of the legislature to exempt the
proceeds of the policy from the claims of general creditors is clear, an intent
to bar any equitable claims to some or all of the specific proceeds is decidedly
doubtful. See Bank of Steward County v. Mardre (1914) I42 Ga. 110, 82 S. E.
519; Dell v. Varnedoe (1918) 148 Ga. 91, 95 S. E. 977. A recent case under
such a statute reached a result contrary to the instant case. Mass. Bonding Co. v.
Josselyn (1923, Mich.) 194 N. W. 548.
INTERNATIONAL LAw-TAXATION OF PROPERTY OF A FOREIGN SovEREIGN.-The
Board of Supervisors of Jefferson County, Kentucky, instituted proceedings to
assess tobacco purchased in the state by the French Government to be sold in
France under the tobacco monopoly of that government, but temporarily held
up by the war in a Kentucky warehouse. The French Government, claiming to
own the property in a public and not a private capacity, protested against the
assessment. Held, that the assessment was improper, as the decision of a foreign
government that property is owned in a public capacity is conclusive.' French
Republic v. Board of Supervisors of Jefferson County (1923, Ky.) 252 S. W. 124.
The question raised in this case has apparently never before been adjudicated
by an American court. A foreign sovereign cannot be sued without his consent.
The Parlement Belge (i88o, C. A.) L. R. 5 P. Div. 197; (1922) 22 CoL. L. Rrv.
595. And the public property of such sovereign has a like immunity. Briggs v.
Light Boats (1865) 93 Mass. 157. But the principle is not extended to give com-
plete immunity in matters of taxation. A foreign diplomat's hotel even if owned
by his government is subject to property taxes in the absence of special reciprocal
agreement I Satow, A Guide to Diplomatic Practice (1917) 280; 4 Moore, Digest
of International Law (19o6) sec. 667. When a foreign legation occupies rented
property, the owner is not exempt from taxes. Parkinson v. Potter (1885)
L. R. 16 Q. B. Div. 152. Diplomatic officials are exempt from personal and
customs taxes but not from local assessments for objects from which they derive
benefits, as for the maintenance of lighting, and sewerage systems. I Twiss,
The Law of Nations (1861) sec. 203; Odier, Des Privileges et Immunitis des
Agents Diplomatiques (1890) 260, 268, and 292. In England they are not liable
for parochial taxes. Macartney v. Garbutt (i8go) L. R. 24 Q. B. Div. 368.
But uniform rules are impossible because exemptions are granted out of courtesy
and not of right. Heffter, Le Droit International Public de L'Europe (Bergson's
trans. 1866) sec. 217. When a foreign diplomat acts in a private capacity he is
usually subject to taxation. I Wharton, Digest of International Law (1886) 653;
Novello v. Toogood (1823, K. B.) I Bar. & Cr. 554. In regard to the sovereign
himself, the writers always make the distinction between acts done as a sovereign
and acts done as a private individual. Grotius, De Jure Belli Ac Pacs (2
Whewell's ed. 1853) Lib. II, cap. XIV, I and II; Hall, International Law (7th
ed. 1917) sec. 49. This distinction is of more practical importance when applied
to the activities of a state to determine whether they are acts jure imperii or
jure gestionis. Borchard, Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad (1915) sec.
72; (1918) 27 YA=a LAW JOURNAL, 1082. This question came frequently before
the courts of all countries during and after the World War in connection with
the large merchant fleets owned and operated by governments in purely commer-
cial enterprises. Although the decisions disclose no uniformity, there is strong
authority for granting immunity from local jurisdiction only when the vessel is
engaged in public service. The Pesaro (i921, S. D. N. Y.) 277 Fed. 473. For a
general discussion, see (1922) 34 REvUE INTERNATIONAL Du DRoIT MARiTIME, I;
RECENT CASE NOTES
Weston, Actions Against the Property of Sovereigns (1919) 32 HAgv. L. REV.
266. Such a distinction is useful and proper. The tendency of international law
as revealed in the above mentioned ship cases is to follow the suggestion of
Chief Justice Marshall to treat nations which enter the market place as if they
were private traders. See Bank of The United States v. Planters' Bank of
Georgia (1824, U. S.) 9 Wheat. 94, 9o7. The decision in the instant case can
be justified on the ground that the property was only temporarily detained in
Kentucky through the exigencies of war. But when foreign public property
has a definite tax situs within the state, foreign governments should not claim
such immunity.
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE-ANNULMENT FOR FRAUD---BREACH OF PROMISE TO HAVE
SECOND CEREMONY IN CATHOLIC CHURCH.-rhe plaintiff, a Catholic, and the
defendant, a Protestant, were married in a Protestant Church. The wife had
promised to have the marriage afterwards solemnized in a Catholic Church.
She also had represented herself to be a widow, but in fact was a divorcee and
knew that the plaintiff's faith forbade his marrying a divorced woman. There
was no issue. Upon discovering the facts, the plaintiff ceased cohabitation and
sued for annulment on the ground of fraud. The defendant demurred. Held,
that the demurrer should be sustained. Wells v. Talham (1923, Wis.) 194
N. W. 36.
To secure an annulment of the marriage relation, it is said that the fraud
must go to the essentialia of the relation. Schouler, Domestic Relations (6th ed.
1921) sec. 23. There is, however, no test of what are the essentialia. Misrepre-
sentation of social standing or general personal characteristics or condition in
life will not suffice. Chlipman v. Johnston (1921) 237 Mass. 5o2, 13o N. E. 65;
14 A. L. R. 121, note. Nor will simple concealment of unchastity. Schouler,
loc. cit. But annulment has been allowed where chastity was expressly made a
condition. Gatto v. Gatto (1919) 79 N. H. 177, io6 AtI. 493 (incest by wife);
(1920) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 365. Or where the woman concealed pregnancy.
Reynolds v. Reynolds (1862, Mass.) 3 Allen, 6o5. Similarly, for concealment
of a clear menace to the health of the plaintiff or any offspring. C. - v.
C. (1914) 158 Wis. 3oi, 148 N. W. 865 (venereal disease); 5
A. L. R. 1013, l16, note; Davis v. Davis (1919, Ch.) 90 N. J. Eq. 158, iO6 Atl.
644 ("hereditary chronic tuberculosis"); cf. Gould v. Gould (9o5) 78 Conn.
242, 61 AtI. 604 (epilepsy); (1919) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 225. Or where the
defendant concealed an intention not to assume the duties of the marital state.
Millar v. Millar (1917) 175 Calif. 797, 167 Pac. 394 (refusal to have intercourse) ;
Anders v. Anders (1916) 224 Mass. 438, 113 N. E. 2o3 (intention to desert at
church door); L. R A. 1916 E, 1274, note; (1916) 26 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 159.
Annulments are more readily granted where the marriage has not been con-
summated, particularly when the plaintiff is of tender years and the defendant
immoral. Brown v. Scott (1922) 140 Md. 258, 117 Atl. 114; (1922) 71 U. PA.
L. Rav. 85; NOTES (1922) 22 COL. L. REv. 662. Or when the plaintiff is led
reasonably to believe that the ceremony was only a betrothal. Ford v. Stier
[1896] I P. Div. I. Or when a subsequent public or religious ceremony was
promised. Clark v. Field (1841) 13 Vt. 460; Rozsa v. Rozsa (1922, Sup. Ct.)
117 Misc. 728, 191 N. Y. Supp. 868; Rubinson v. Rubinson (1920, Sup. Ct)
11O Misc. 114, 181 N. Y. Supp. 28; (ig2o) 2o COL. L. REv. 7o8. The New York
cases were decided under the liberal rule announced in that state that, since
marriage is a civil contract, any fraud which is the legal cause of the marriage
is operative. DiLorenzo v. DiLorenzo (19o3) 174 N. Y. 467, 67 N. E. 63. That
rule may perhaps be explained by the paucity of grounds for divorce in that
state. See (1920) 20 COL. L. REv. 7o8; and cf. N. Y. C. P. A. 1921, art. 67, sec.
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1135. The instant case might well have adopted the results reached in New
York without necessarily accepting their theory in full. The mores of a particu-
lar sect may be so acute in these matters as to leave the unfortunate mate a
social outcast and with a blemish on his or her conscience. Cf. Sumner, Folk-
ways (19o6) secs. 414, 435, 437. And the legal power given a clergyman to
solemnize marriages is an implicit recognition of the social value of protecting
this interest where it exists. Cf. Despatie v. Tremblay [1921, P. C.] i A. C. 702.
MoRTGAGES-DEFENSES AvAI.LLE To GRAN=E AsSUMING INVALI MORTGAGE.-
The plaintiff, an owner of land on which the defendant supposedly held a mort-
gage, sold a portion of the land to X, who as part of the purchase price assumed
and agreed to pay a proportionate sum of the mortgage. X entered into posses-
sion. The mortgage proved to be a forgery, and the plaintiff brought suit to
cancel it. The defendant impleaded the assuming grantee, and when the latter
failed to appear asked that against him the mortgage be foreclosed. Held, that
as to that portion of the land granted to X, the plaintiff could not maintain the
suit under 1 Bunn's Okla. Comp. Sts. 1921, sec. 466, requiring possession at the
time of suit, and that since the assuming grantee was estopped to deny the validity
of the mortgage, the plaintiff was also estopped. Exchange Trust Co. v. Ireton
(x923, Okla.) 213 Pac. 3o9.
A grantee who assumes a mortgage as part of the purchase price is generally
precluded from contesting the validity of the mortgage assumed. Freeman v.
Auld (187o) 44 N. Y. 50; 3 Tiffany, Real Property (2d ed. 1920) 2571; 2 Jones,
Mortgages (7th ed. 1915) see. 74; L. R. A. 1917 C, 829, note. This rule in its
origin related primarily to the mortgagor. The reasoning is that the debt being
valid, the mortgaged property becomes the primary source for its discharge, and
the grantee cannot throw back on the grantor the burden of paying the debt.
Foy v. Armstrong (19Ol) 113 Iowa, 629, 85 N. W. 753; Cummings v. Jackson
(1896) 55 N. J. Eq. 8o5, 38 Atl. 763. To the assuming grantee there is no
want or failure of consideration. Moulton v. Haskell (1892) 50 Minn. 367,
52 N. W. 96o. And although the grantor may have a personal defense to the
mortgage debt, he has, by the terms of the grant, bargained for the power to
bind his assuming grantee by ratifying the transaction. Lee v. Stiger (1879) 30
N. J. Eq. 61o (usury); Davis v. Davis (1912) ig Calif. App. 797, 127 Pac. IO51
(statute of limitations) ; see Farmers' State Bank v. Midland Savings & Loan
Co. (1919) 76 Okla. 245, 185 Pac. 94 (usury). Nor can the assuming grantee
escape the estoppel which his grantor must bear where the mortgage was issued
ultra vires. American Waterworks Co. v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (1896,
C. C. A. 8th) 73 Fed. 956. And of all the above the mortgagee is permitted
by the cases to reap the benefit. The rules are based on the assumption that the
mortgage, however defective, was given to secure a valid debt, which debt the
mortgagor's grantee has assumed. It should have no application to a situation
where the mortgage is a forgery and the supposed debt is non-existent. But a
similar result has been reached even where a statute declares a usurious debt
void. Scanlan v. Grimmer (1898) 71 Minn. 351 74 N. W. 146; Hitter v,.
Whitlow (i899) 66 Ark. 121, 49 S. W. 353; Jones, op. cit. sec. 745. Where a
statute is aimed at rohibiting such transactions, this result seems questionable,
Tiffany, op. cit. at p. 2575 ("hardly conceivable"). Some cases hold that
the mortgagee may recover from the mortgagor's assuming grantee but must
hold the proceeds as trustee for the mortgagor. Freeman v. Auld, supra. In the
instant case the statute may justify the decision, but to preclude the grantor
from a defense because of rules against the grantee which have come into
existence only in order to benefit the grantor is somewhat anomalous, as well as
contrary to any reasonable construction of intention.
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PROPERTY-MUTUAL MISTAKE IN SURVEYING BOUNDARY-EQuITABLE RELIEF
AGAINST EJECTMENT SUIT ON PAYMENT OF COmPENSATION-The defendant aided
in a survey made by the complainant to determine the boundary line between
their lands. The complainant then erected an apartment house on his land
exactly to the line as fixed by the survey. It in fact encroached about one foot
on the defendant's land. The defendant brought ejectment. The complainant
then sought an injunction against the defendant's suit and a release to him of
the disputed land. Held, that the relief be granted, provided that the complainant
make equitable compensation for the value of the land. Magnolia Construction
Co. v. McQuillan (1923, N. J.) 121 Atl. 734.
The recognition of a mistaken boundary line without knowledge of the mistake or
fraud does not preclude the owner from claiming to the true line. Patton v. Snith
(19o2) 171 MO. 231, 71 S. W. 187; Montresso v. Kent (1921) 96 Conn. 346, 113
At1. 922. He may sue in trespass and recover damages suffered up to the time
of suit. McGann v. Hamilton (1889) 58 Conn. 69, 19 At1. 376; see Stowers v.
Gilbert (1898) 156 N. Y. 6o0, 51 N. E. 282. When there is an encroachment
which disturbs the surface he may also bring ejectment. Purtle v. Bell (1907)
225 Ill. 523, 8o N. E. 350. Or he may obtain a decree authorizing him to remove
the encroachment See Hofdgkins v. Farrington (1889) 15o Mass. 19, 22 N. E.
73. By the better view the same is true when the encroachment is entirely below
the surface. Wachster v. Christopher (19o7) 128 Ga. 229, 57 S. E. 511; 1I
L. R. A. (N. s.) 917, note; see COMMENTS (1917) 27 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 265.
But the difficulties of execution where heavy foundation stones or buildings have
been laid make the two latter remedies inadequate. See Hahl v. Sugo (1901)
i69 N. Y. Iog, 62 N. E. 135. Mandatory injunctions have therefore been issued
placing the duty of removal on the trespasser. Baron v. Korn (1891) 127 N. Y.
224, 27 N. E. 8o4; 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 402, note. See COMMENT (1922) 10 CALIF.
L. REV. i69. There is however a growing tendency to refuse such injunctions
as against innocent trespassers, where the injury to the latter would be greatly
disproportionate to the benefit derived by the owner. Coombs v. Lenox Realty
(1913) III Me. 178, 88 Atl. 477; Lynch v. Union Institution (1893) 159 Mass.
3o6, 34 N. E. 364; see also (1923) YALF LAw JOURNAL, 205. The New York
courts have granted judgment in the alternative, the injunction to issue unless
the owner is paid the value of the land taken. Goldbacher v. Eggers (1902, Sup.
Ct.) 38 Misc. 36, 76 N. Y. Supp. 88i, affirmed (19o4) 179 N. Y. 551, 71 N. E.
1131. And the owner may be required to execute a release of the land on
receipt of its value. See Herrman v. Hartwood Holding Co. (i92o) 193 App.
Div. 115, 183 N. Y. Supp. 402. The instant case even reaches the same result
where the relief is asked by the innocent trespasser. The result is analogous
to cases of accession or confusion of personal property, where an innocent
trespasser may have the power to acquire legal title, if a return of the chattel
itself would work an undue hardship. See Wetherbee v. Green (1871) 22 Mich.
311; Eaton v. Langley (1898) 65 Ark. 448, 47 S. W. 123. The doctrine in the
principal case is properly limited to cases where an order to remove the offending
structure would "shock the conscience of a civilized court."
PUBLIC SERVIcE LAW-STATE REGULATION OF CONTRACTS BETWEEN MUNIcIPALI-
TIES AND PUBLIC UTILITIEs.-A borough ordinance gave a railway the privilege
of using its streets on condition that it keep them in repair from curb to curb.
Upon failure to repair, the borough filed a complaint with the public service
commission to compel performance of the obligation. The commission acting
under Pa. Sts. 1920, secs. 18125-18127 empowering it to regulate rates, ordered
the railway to repair only that portion of the street lying between the ends of
the ties, on the ground that the original contract was an unjust burden upon
212 YALE LAW JOURNAL
the operating company. The commission appealed from a decree of the superior
court reversing the above order. Held, (one judge dissenting) that the appeal be
dismissed as the statute gave the commission control over rate contracts only.
Borough of Swarthmore v. Public Service Commission (1923, Pa.) 121 Atl. 488.
Municipalities as agents of the state may be authorized to make binding con-
tracts with public service companies. See Victoria v. Victoria Power Co. (1922)
134 Va. 134, 114 S. E. 92; Trenton v. New Jersey (1923, U. S.) 43 Sup. Ct 534.
Such contracts cannot be changed by the municipality without impairing the
obligation of contracts in violation of Art. I, sec. io of the Federal Constitution.
Minneapolis v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co. (1909) 215 U. S. 417, 30 Sup. Ct. 118.
But the contract is said to be made subject to the police power of the state and
within that power can be changed by the state without impairing the obligation
of the contract. Milwaukee Electric Ry. v. Wis. R. R. Commission (915) 238
U. S. 174, 35 Sup. Ct. 820 (against the utility); South Glen Falls v. Public
Service Commission (1919) 225 N. Y. 216, 121 N. E. 777 (against the munici-
pality) ; Scranton v. Public Service Commission (1920) 268 Pa. 192, 11O At. 775
(same); Burdick, Regulating Franchise Rates (192o) 29 YALE LAW JOURNiAL,
589; (1920) i Micx. L. REv. 112. As against the municipality, the state is
also said to have power as principal to revoke the contract of its agent, and
substitute a new contract. Sapulpa v. Okla. Nat. Gas Co. (1920) 79 Okla. 196,
196 Pac. 224. This is true unless the grant of power is in unequivocal terms.
Helena v. Helena Light & Ry. Co. (1922) 63 Mont. io8, 2o7 Pac. 337. On the
other hand, at least one court has expressly refused to permit the state to disturb
the contracts of its municipalities. Lima v. Public Service Commission (igig)
ioo Ohio St. 416, 126 N. E. 318; and see to the same effect Va. Western Power
Co. v. Clifton Forge (igig) 125 Va. 469, 99 S. E. 723, but apparently overruled
by Victoria v. Victoria Power Co., supra. The same result has been reached by
construing the power of the commission to regulate rates as subject to the con-
sent of local authorities. Quinby v. Public Service Commission (1918) 223
N. Y. 244, 119 N. E. 433. But this decision has been strictly limited to street
railways. South Glen Falls v. Public Service Commission, supra. Some states
expressly prohibit irrevocable contracts with utilities. Opelika Sewer Co. v.
Opelika (1922, M. D. Ala.) 280 Fed. 155. Others expressly reserve a power to
modify such contracts. San Antonio v. San Antonio Public Service Commission
(1921) 255 U. S. 547, 41 Sup. Ct. 428. The type of contract presented in the
instant case has been regulated by state statutes even in the absence of any
statutory reservation of power. Worcester v. Street Ry. Co. (1905) 196 U. S.
539, 25 Sup. Ct 327. The apparent conflict with the general trend of authority
seems to arise from the fact that the statute in the instant case delegating the
power to regulate rates to the public service commission was not broad enough
to include the regulation of this type of contract.
TORTS-WRONGFUL DEATH ACT-INTERPRETATION-DEATH IN SAME DIsAsTER
OF PERSON ENTITLED TO SUE.-One Mrs. Baker and her husband were killed by
the defendant's train in the same accident. The husband, however, lived two
hours longer than the wife. They left no minor children. Her administrator
brought this action for her wrongful death under Mo. Rev. Sts. igig, sec. 4217,
which provides for such action by an administrator "if there be no husband or
wife, .... " The trial court overruled the defendant's objection that no cause
of action was stated. The defendant appealed. Held, (one judge dissenting)
that as the cause of action never vested in the husband within the meaning of
the statute, the judgment should be affirmed. Betz v. Kansas City Southern Ry.
(1923, M o.) 253 S. W. 1O89.
A right of action for wrongful death vests only in persons expressly named
by statute. Hill v. Shafty (1923, Sup. Ct) 121 Misc. 273, 2O N. Y. Supp. 729;
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L. R. A. I916 E, 118, note. By the weight of authority it vests immediately on
death in the first surviving person in the order given in the statute. Hammond
v. Leuiston, A. & W. St. Ry. (19o9) io6 Me. 209, 76 Atl. 672; 30 L. R. A.
(N. s.) 78, note. And on the death of such survivor, the right of action, in the
absence of statute, does not accrue to his administrator. Freie v. St. Louis-San
Francisco Ry. (192o) 283 Mo. 457, 222 S. W. 824; 24 L. R. A. (N. s.) 844, note.
Nor does it vest in the next surviving person in the order named by statute.
Hammond v. Lewiston, A. & W. St. Ry., supra; Benoit v. Miami Beach Electric
Co. (1923, Fla.) 96 So. 158. In the instant case the survival of the husband was
held not to be a survival within the meaning of the statute. This is in accord
with the view that such statutes are remedial and to be liberally construed.
Patek v. Am. Smelting & Refining Co. (19o7, C. C. A. 8th) 154 Fed. 19o. It
overrides the view expressed previously in Missouri that the statute should be
strictly construed because in derogation of the common law. Chandler v. Chicago
& Alton Ry. (1913) 251 Mo. 592, 158 S. W. 35. And, as is pointed out by the
dissenting opinion, this interpretation in effect adds a clause to the statute allow-
ing the administrator to sue where, because of incapacity, the suit cannot be
maintained by the person named in the statute. This result seems desirable, as
it effectuates the purpose of the statute to create a cause of action where none
existed at common law. See Gilkeson v. Mo. Pac. Ry. (19o9) 222 Mo. 173, 121
S. W. 138; see Mo. Rev. Sts. i919, sec. 7048. The difficulties raised by the
instant case heighten the desirability of that class of statfites which give the right
of action only to the administrator.
VERDlCrs-JINT ToRT-FEAsoRs-APPoRTIoNeENT OF DAMAGES BY Juiy.-In
an action for damages against joint tort-feasors, the jury returned a verdict for
the plaintiff for $4,ooo, $3,500 to be paid by one defendant and $5oo by the other.
The court entered judgment against each defendant for $4,000. The second
defendant appealed from a refusal to order a new trial. Held, (three judges
dissenting) that the attempted apportionment was properly disregarded as
surplusage. Hall v. McClure (1923, Kan.) 212 Pac. 875.
At common law joint tort-feasors are equally liable for the full amount of the
damages. Hence in the absence of a statute juries have no power to apportion
such liability. Lake Erie R. R. Co. v. Halleck (1922, Ind. App.) 136 N. E. 39.
Where the jury returns a separate verdict against each defendant, according to
one view judgment may be entered against all defendants for the largest sum
found against any one. Halsey v. Woodruff (183o, Mass.) 9 Pick. 555. In some
states the verdict is declared regular and each defendant is required to pay the
amount found against him. Rhame v. City of Sumter (igig) 113 S. C. I51, 101
S. E. 832. It has been suggested that the plaintiff and not the defendant might
have such a verdict set aside. Hooks v. Vet (I911, C. C. A. 5th) 192 Fed. 314.
In a few states the verdict is declared void and a new trial ordered. Chrudinsky
v. Evans (917) 85 Or. 548, 167 Pac. 562; see McCalla v. Shaw (1884) 72 Ga.
458. Nor are the courts in accord where the jury returns a general verdict
followed by an attempted apportionment. On the theory that liability is several
as well as joint, some states have the curious rule that the plaintiff must after
such a verdict elect his defendant, enter a nolle prosequi as to the others, and
take judgment for the amount found against him. Warren v. Westrup (i8go) 44
Minn. 237, 46 N. W. 347; Nashville R. R. Co. v. Trawick (i9o6, Tenn.) 99 S. W.
695. Or as in the instant case, all attempt at apportionment is treated as
surplusage and ignored. Lake Erie R. R. Co. v. Halleck, supra; Pearson v.
Arlington Dock Co. (192o) iii Wash. 14, 189 Pac. 559. By the minority view
such a verdict is fatally defective. Whitaker v. Tatem (1881) 48 Conn. 520;
Glore v. Akin (19o8) IXi Ga. 481, 62 S. E. 58o. But where punitive damages
have been awarded against one defendant there may be separate judgments
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according to the verdict. Louisville Ry. v. Roth (I9O8) 130 Ky. 759, IL4 S. W.
264. A simple and practical remedy lies in the power of the court, on the return
of a verdict attempting apportionment, to inform the jury of its error and request
a corrected verdict. Austin, Ry. v. Faust (igio) 63 Tex. Civ. App. 91, 133 S. W.
449; Forslund v. Swenson (1923, Neb.) 192 N. W. 649. The decision in the instant
case follows perhaps the most rational of the first described courses, though it is
unfortunate that the trial court did not apply the simple remedy last mentioned.
WILLs-CoNTRAcT TO BEQUEATH-LIMITATION OF DAMAGES TO THE VALUE OF
THE CoNsiDEATIoN.-The plaintiff was injured while in his uncle's employ. In
consideration of his uncle's promise that his will would contain provision for
plaintiff's life support, plaintiff promised to forbear to sue for compensation.
On the uncle's death intestate, the plaintiff sued for breach of contract. The
defendant appealed from a judgment of the lower court allowing recovery for
an amount sufficient to support plaintiff for life. Held, (two judges dissenting)
that the measure odf damages should be limited to compensation for plaintiff's
injury. Frieders v. Frieders' Estate (1923, Wis.) 193 N. W. 77.
The breach of a contract to make a will in a particular manner gives the
injured party a right to damages at law, or, in the case of realty, to specific
performance in equity. See Gordon v. Spellman (1gi8) 145 Ga. 682, 89 S. E.
749; Costigan, Constructive Trusts (1915) 28 HARv. L. REv. 237, 244; Gardner,
Wills (19o3) sec. 20. Harsh results to the deceased's estate may be a defense
in equity but not to a recovery of damages. Costigan, op. cit. supra, at pp. 237,
245, note i8. But when the consideration is past, the plaintiff is limited to a
recovery in quantum meruit. Murtha v. Donohoo (1912) 149 Wis. 481, 136
N. W. 158. In the instant case, the court purports to follow Murtha v. Donohoo,
supra, failing to note that in that case there was a past consideration, whereas
in this, there is a present one in the promise of forbearance to sue. See Anson,
Contracts (Corbin's ed. 1919) sec. 131. And in the case of a definite promise
based on present consideration, the courts have uniformly held that the measure
of damages is the value of the thing promised. Thompson v. Romack (1916)
174 Iowa, 155, 156 N. W. 310; Jefferson v. Simpson (1919) 83 W. Va. 274, 98
S. E. 212; cf. Noyes v. Noyes (1916) 224 Mass. 125, 112 N. E. 850. In proposing
what is really an exception to this fundamental rule of contract, the court in the
instant case refers to the absence of the formality required by the Statute of
Wills, and to the danger of fraud on the estate of the deceased. The confusion
here is in treating a contract as a will. See COMMENTS (1918) 27 YALE LAw
JOURNAL, 542. Danger of fraud is eliminated if evidence of the contract is
clear and convincing. See Kingsbury v. Kingsbury (1923, Sup. Ct.) 120 Misc.
362, 198 N. Y. Supp. 512. This was amply satisfied in the instant case by the
presence of two witnesses at the making of the contract. The court has under-
taken to remake a contract contrary to established rules of law and to what the
majority opinion itself recognizes as the justice of the instant case. Cf. Krell v.
Codman (i89I) 154 Mass. 454, 28 N. E. 578.
